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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the ]\fatter of the Estate of 
OLA UDIUS 1V ALLI CH, Deceased, 
FRED R. \V ALLICH, 
Petitioner a.nd Appellant 
-vs-
A. C. 1VALLiiCH, et al., 
Cross-Petitioners 
and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10569 
STATEMEN'T OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
In this action, petitioner-appellant Fred R. Wallich 
SP(~Irn a dctNmination that a prior Decree of Distribution 
of the District Court made and entered in these probate 
proceedings in 1959 distributed tlw residue of the dece-
<l<'nt's estate to him outright, or that under the Will of 
tl1c' decedent herein, he was tht> bent>ficiary of an outright 
gift or an estate for years with power to consume 
principal, and that he has no duty to account to re-
2 
spondents. Respondents, vvho are ::;ome of their heirs 
of th0 decedent, cross-1wtibon for an ordPr requiring 
appellant to account as a testamentary trustee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
On trial on January 2G, 196G, the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable A. H. Ellett presiding~ 
sustained respondents' objections to the introduction by 
appellant of evidence and appellant's written offer of 
proof and, based solely upon the probate file herein, 
determined that as a matter of law a D0cree of Distribu-
tion of February 24, 1959 incorporated into its terms a 
portion of thP vVill of the dect•dent, that tlw -Will of tlH' 
decedent was not ambiguous, and that appellant is a 
testarnPntary trustPP undPr the -Will of the deeedent 
and ordered appellant to account for his administration 
of the trust and that the trust rPs, as deterrninPd by 
the accounting, be distributed to the beneficiaries then'-
of. From this Order and DPcrPP of .T anuary 28, 19GG, 
appellant app0a1s. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O~ APPEAL 
AppPllant SPeks revrnml of the District Court's 
OrdPr and DPcreci of January 28, 19GG, and remand of 
t11P casp to the District Court with instructions to rnter 
a <lecreP drtermining that as a matter of lmv the Decree 
of Distribution of Ft-hruary 2-t, 1959, l1erPin <listrihnted 
3 
the residue of the estate to apprllant outright and appel-
lant has no duty to account as a trust('e, or in the 
alternativP, that the District Court he instructed that 
the \Vill of the decedrnt herein is ambiguous and that 
it lw dirPctPd to rPe<~ive evidence to r('solve the ambiguity. 
STATKl\U~:N"T OF F ACTR 
Tlw tPstator Claudius \Y allich died l\Iay 23, 1958, a 
re8ident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and his Last Will 
dated October 11, 1950, with coditils, was duly admitted 
to probate by the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
\\' alkPr Bank & Trust Company of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
was appointed ExPcntor b\' Order made and enterc>d 
.Jul.'' Hi, 1%8 (R 19,20). 
On F<:'hruary 5, 1959, tlie gxecutor, Walker Bank, 
filt>d its Pt>tition for Rett1Pment of Executor's First and 
Final Account and for Distribution rPciting that the 
(•state of said deeea:wd was in all r<>spects in condition 
to lK• rlo8ed and the beneficiaries of the vVill of said 
duePasPd \Yen~ Pntitled to have all the remaining prop-
<·rty nm\' on hand distrilrnted to tlH·m. Specifically, in 
paragTnph 13(q), the ExPcutor petitioned that the resi-
dn(· of t!JP ('StatP h0 distrihuted " ... to Fred R. \Vallicli, 
... to hr· !will and use<l h.'· him in his discretion in 
::1 eonlanc!' with and pursuant to the proyi:-;ions of para-
~·Tnpli 'i of' tlJp ~\\'ii] of th<> dr•('PaS<'<l." (R. ~9). 
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K otiee of tlw hearing of thP P<'tition 1rns µ;1wn all 
heirs (R. -t-9). Onlr n-';-;1iond<•nt A. C. \\ralli("h ol1j<•d<'d 
to the Pr~tition. Ii is objection was that lw elainwd to 
hP the hPn<>fieiary of $10,000 urnln parag;raph 7 of th<· 
\\rill, a diff Pr<>nt dispnte than the 0:10 now lwfore tlu~ 
( 'onrt. 
Bef'on' ]waring on the J\,tition for Distrilm~ion, tl1<' 
Ex<'tutor, \\'alker Hank & r11 rust, and n·spornlent "\. C. 
\\'allid1, through e01msPI, (•nt<'l'<'ll into a Stipulation 
n·citinp; .. A. C. ·w alliel1's c-lairn undn paragraph 7 of the 
\\'ill, agn•<'inp: that all speeific l<'µ;aeie~: lw paid and tliat: 
"All of the n'st, residrn· <~nd rc11w .. 1<d.·1· of tl. 1 ' 
/JrU]Jerly now on hand for <fo,trilmtion a~' i~1 said 
]H-'titio·n set forth 7H' rlistrilJ11/('(l rwd d1/i1·err·d tu 
Fred ll. Tf'alli('h as set forth in said }Je!itio11, 
<'xrept, that tlwre shall lit' rdairn•d out oi' :.;~1id 
rest, n·sidrn' and n·111airnl<'r the sum of $1 ~J,U();;.1 :o 
easli; that said $15,000.00 ('asl1 fornl :-;lw 11 ll1· 
ordered l'Ptai1wcl h~· thP Ex<•en(or rnd;l f'lldlli·r 
ord<>r of th<> C'OUJ't ht>rein, for 1li(• ptlrpm;l' <:[ 
satisf\ing thp elaim of said A. C. \YalL('lt to sn;d 
$10,000.00 heqnest, in tl1<' <>vent t:iat 11<· i!.; !'lH'<'1 ,•.;:-.-
ful in ('Stahlislting his rip;ht th<>n·to: that i1~ th<· 
<>vent lw is unsureessfnl in es1nhlislii11.": l1is rigl1'. 
therPto, or anr part of said $1~>,000.00 r1•;11:iim: 
aft<•r thP satisfaction of ill<• clnirn of sa:d .\. ( '. 
\\Tallieh, said arnonnt aJHl ~rn:,· <l' ('1:::1~·'.; 1 1 io:;~: 
I l . I 1 . I . ' . I () tlwreon !JI' OJ'(, l';-<'I jHil! In I 1:1· sr:u, /'. 1 11 !" 
1Fa11ic11 r1s 1711' u·sil!111r11.·1 f: 1·111·/i1·inr:1 u/ i?u· Ti' 1/ 
().r 1 710 rl1•1·or•,·1·17" ( l•'11·1··]·:1s·-~ .,.11,,.1 I I ' -:'. 1 -~ I). I ' I ' • '. ' • • - ii ! I I' . ' ' '_\ • ' I ' j ' ' 
Note that this Rtipulation does not purport to create 
a trust. 
Based upon this Stipulation and there being no other 
objection to the Petition, the District Court on Febru-
ary 24, 1959, made and entered its Order Settling 
Executor'R Account, Fixing 'Compensation, and of Partial 
Distribution (R. 52-G3), which provided in paragraph 6: 
"All of the rest, residue and remainder of the 
property now on hand for distribution, together 
with all property unknown that may hereafter 
discovered to have been owned by the deceased 
at the time of his death or to have been acquired 
by his estate subsequent thereto, be, and the same 
is hereby distributed to Fred R. Wa.llich, to br 
held and used by him in his discretion in accord-
ance with and p1trsuant to the provisions of para-
graph 8 of the TVill of the deceased." (Emphasis 
added) 
Thereafter, the Executor obtained and filed two 
Receipts rxPcnted h.\T the appellant, both dated May 9, 
19GO. 
The first ackno,~wledges the receipt of 3,000 shares 
ol' Crmn1 ZPllerbaeh Corporation common stock, "under 
tl1<' provisions of the order of the above entitled court 
llU1(l<' and entered on the 2-±th dav of February 1959, 
to lrnve hold administer and dis1wse of the same as 
' ' 
'i'<·starnentary rl'rnstee and pursuant tn tlie provisions 
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of Paragraph 11]ight of thr Last \Yill arnl T<•sbnll'nt o 1· 
said Clau<lins \\'alli('h, DPC'l'<lsl'cl.'' (R. 19~)) 
Tlu• sPcond Ree Pi pt n•ci frs th(• n•ec• i pt of :3,000 skn·( ·s 
of Cro'\\·n Zt'll('l'ha('h Corporation C'Olll111011 stoek lJ.'< I1'n•d 
R. \Vallieh as an individual \1-itlwnt n•fpn·nc'l) to mw 
eapacit.'- as Trust<'<' and statPs that t!iP distrilm1<'P is, 
"to hav<', hold, administer and disposp of tli<> same as 
pnrsuant to tlw }H'ovisions of Paragraph Eight oi' th<· 
Last -Will & T<•stamt'nt of sai(l ( 1 lnndins \\' nllieli. J)('-
«<•as<><l." (R. '.201) 
Tlwn·after, this Court af'firnwd the Dis1 rid Court\ 
judg111Pnt that l'Psponclent A. C. \Y allicl1 was tint it l('d to 
thP additional ht'<jll<'st of $10.000. (H. 1~0). TT'o!lir},1 1. 
H'a11icli (19GO) 10 l~tah :.'.c119:!, ::l:JO P. :.:1<1 ()1-1-. 
On .?II a_'I- JO, ] 9()(), \Valker Bank, as Ex1'i'nt;Jr, !)('( i-
tiorn•d tlH' Disfr!d Court for final distrilmtion (H. ~(l~­
:!l<i). On l\fay 10, J'.)()0, tl1e District (\nut 111a<1l· i~s Onl1·1· 
Settling Final A('connt, of ~u1ipl<·11wntal (l.1Hl f'innl 
Distribution and for Dis('harg-P of 1':x<'c·ntor (IL ~17-'.2'.21), 
autho.ri7.ing :rncl dir<>eting- th<· l'<'sichw li<· (listril>ntP<l t<1 
np1wllant, saying: 
":1. That thP n·maininp; :-i_ssets of 1 ]1,• 1 :;-;tn1<·, 
ronsisting- of thP sum ol' $-'i-,000.00 <'nsli ])(• ;1:11\H'-
cliatPl.'- distrilmk<l and pai<l b~- tlw E\:<'('~l;,,;- /I) 
F rerl R. TY all ich, !11 e n·s Id" ({ ry lw 11 e f ic iu ri; uj t711 
1Yi!1 o/ llu' der,r•rr,u1 .. .. " ( l':rnpl1;'.sis '": 1, ,[ ! 
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Note that this Order for Final Distribution makes 
no reference to the discretion vested in Fred R. vVallich 
nor to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of said "'Will which 
references were contained in the above quoted provisions 
of the Ordtir for Partial Distribution. 
On June 10, 1960, the District Court made and 
entered its Final Discharge of Executor, discharging 
Walker Bank and Trust Company as Executor. (R 222). 
Parap;raph 8 of the decedent's Will provides: 
"8. All the rest, residue and remainder of my 
estate, ... I hereby give, devise and bequeath 
to my said nephew, Fred R. vV allich, son of my 
deceased brother, Julius C. W allich, in trust, 
nevertheless, to be held and used by him in his 
sole and absolute discretion, and without restric-
tion or control of any kind whatsoever, together 
with the income therefrom, if any, as a reserve 
to meet any emergencies that may arise in, and 
for the use and benefit of, the \:Vallich family, 
that is, my blood relations, regardless of their 
degree of kindred or relationship to me; said 
fund, and the income therefrom, to be held and 
used by my said nephew until his death or for a 
period of five ( 5) years after the date of my 
death, whichever shall first occur, and upon the 
occurrence of such event, my said nephew, or in 
the event of his death prior to five ( 5) years 
after my death, then his wife, Loretta VVallich, 
who shall act as successor Trustee without bond, 
shall distribntP any part of the Trnst fund that 
may be then on hand, to my heirs at law then 
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living, upon the principle of rPpre:sentation. ~ly 
said nephew in the administration of the trust 
herein irnposPd u1wn him :shall act without the 
necessity of furnishing any bond or any other 
security, and without the necessity of making 
any accounting of any nature what:soever to any 
}Jerson or party eoneerning the administration of 
his trnst." 
PivP years elapsed following thP deeedt•nfs death. 
HPspornlent, A. C. \Vallich, dt•manded that the amwllant 
aecount, as testamentary trusteP, fo.r thP disposition ol" 
tlw estate distrilmtPd to 11irn. (R. :z:rl) . 
.A]Jpe>llant then on August 20, 19ii3 fil<>d liis "J>0ti-
tion for Discharge of Testm11Pntary Trust<·P,'' (H. 22<i-
2:12), seeking dPtPrn1ination of his dutiPs, if all)' tl1<'i<' 
he, in order to rPsolvt> thP demand of A. C. \ValliclL 
A.11 ht•irs W<'l'<' giv(•n notieP of tl1P hearing of tlw app(•l-
lant\ Petition. 
Hespondt>nt A. '( '. \Valli eh and so111e of tl1e otlin 
J1eirs-at-law fih•d tlwir Answer and Cross Petition n·-
quPsting that ap1wllant lH· rPquin·d to a('eount. (1~. 2Ti"-
2-tl). In sueh, rt>spondPnts elaim a trust \ras crt>ak<l 
1>:- tlw Order of Partial Distrilmtion aml thP \\rill and 
that a]Jpellant, as Tt>stamentar)' Trust('<', is n•qnire<l 
to account for his administration of tl1e trust arnl to ]Ja)" 
to th« lwirs-at-la\\" of said d(•eea;.;ed living- fiv(~ y<'ars 
aftPr th<' <1att• of hi;.; d<•atlt all)" sm11s not dislmr;.;(•<l Ii)' 
app«lhrnt (1u,·irn:.;· tl1(' trn~t p:•riod. <rnd tlta1 ;:; 1:;,•\];1'1t 
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is estopped by the Stipulation between the Executor 
and A. C. W allich and by the acceptance of the residue 
under the Order fo.r Partial Distribution of February 
24, 1959, from asserting that he did not take as Testa-
mentary Trustee. 
Respondents claim to represent 9/24's of the heirs 
of the decedent. (R. 320). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment. (R. 
243-244). After hearing full argument, the District 
Court, Judge Alden J. Anderson presiding, denied re-
spondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground 
"That there is a genuine issue of a material fact and 
that cross petitioners are, therefore, no·t entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." (R. 261). 
Respondents renewed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment at pretrial conference on November 10, 1965, 
hut the same was again denied by the District Court, 
.T udge Stewart l\f. Hanson presiding. ( R. 278) 
Appellant's Petition for Discharge of Testamentary 
Trustee came on regularly for trial in the District Court 
.T ndge A. H. Ellett presiding, on January 26, 1966. 
Upon trial, appellant contended the Decree of Par-
tial Distribution neither created a trust nor incorporated 
hy rPforenee the provisions of paragraph 8 of the 'Will, 
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but distributed the residue outright to appellant. In th<' 
altPrnative, appellant contended that tlw \\Till itsplf 
was ambiguous, and offered written and oral extrinsic 
evidence concerning the facts and circumstances sm·-
rounding the execution of the \Vill and written declara-
tions of the decedent to resolve the ambiguities in tlw 
\Vill and to show that the testator did not intend to 
create a trust but intended an outright gift to appellant 
or a gift for five years with powPr to consume principal. 
Respondenfa ob,jected to the introduction of any extrinsie 
evidence and their objection ·was sustainPd on the ground 
that the \Vill and Decrc•e of Distribution were free from 
ambiguity. rr1ie Court so held even tliough two ot]H·r 
judges had previously denied motions for sm1111rnr.'>" 
judgment upon the Order of Partial Distribution arnl 
thP \Vill. 
Appellant then made his 1nitkn Offer of Proof 
which is included in tlw record on aprwal and rnarl;:<'d 
gxhibit 1. No further <•vidence was offered by any party. 
As shown by his written Offer of Proof, con1aiiwd 
in the Exhibits file in the record, appellant, if JWl'ldit h'd, 
wonld have off er0d the following: 
1. 0. vV. Moyle, Jr., would t0stify that lw, a rt ah 
attorney, JH'E•parc•d the decedent's will and that lte krn'I\' 
the dt>cPd<'nt 20 years lwfon• his death. That a fr\\. <bys 
hefon• thP \Vill was sip;nPd, thP de(·(~dent had writt<'n ont 
11 
and brought to him a typewritten sheet on decedent's 
k'tterhead ·which decedent said expressed the wishes he 
clrsired incorporated into the \Vill to be drmn1, a copy 
of which sheet is attached to the Off er of Proof. On the 
slwet the decedent said: 
"The remainder of my estate, if any, to go to 
my nephew Fred R. Wallich to be held by him 
as a reserve for any emergencies in the W allich 
family, but may he disposed of by him at any 
time and in any manner that he deems best for 
all concerned. without (sic) bond or restrictions 
o.f any kind whatever, and without the necessity 
of rendering an account of his transactions to 
any one." 
ln another portion of the sheet, the decedent wrote out 
a specific bequest to A. C. ·vv allich "to serve as trustee 
for vVilhelmina \Vallich." The decendent did not use the 
·word "trust" in orally discussing the sheet and the gift 
to appellant, but tlw insertion of the word was :Mr. 
Moyle's own idea. On execution of the \:Vill on October 
11, 1950, .Mr .. l\Joyle told the decedent he had grave 
doubts as to whether iiaragraph 8 of the vVill created 
an enforceable trust and that it might be construed as 
mt outright gift to appellant, and the decedent said in 
sulrntance he did not care how it was construed. On 
many occasions before J\farch 195+, the decedent said he 
l1ad not sPen more than one or two of his relatives other 
than appellant for thirty to forty yPars and that he was 
<'iosn to appPllant than lti:-; otlH•r relativPs. 
12 
2. Yictor R. Hansen would tt>stify that hl' is a 
practicing California lawyPr, that he was for six years 
a Judge of the Superior Court for the County of Los 
Angeles, that he was an Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Anti-rl1rust Division of tht> F. S. Dqmrt-
nwnt of Justice and had known the decedent and had 
seen him two or three tirnPs per year from thP <>nd or 
1950. TlH' decedent said that ap1wllant was like a son 
to him; that he had always hePn thongl1tful of him: that 
decedent's estah' was largely dm• to a gift from appel-
lant's father; that his J10usPkeeper and aprwllant had 
heen the clo·sest to him, and that ap1wllant was reall~­
his heir; that there wasn't anyom• PlsP tliat had he<•n 
<'lose to him at all dnring the latPr years of his life; 
that on the occasion of appellant's daughter's Wf'dding, 
decedent put his arm arournl appellant and said "Fn·d 
is going to be my h(~ir; this is reall~· my son"; and that 
similar expressions werP us<>d on a numlwr of other 
ocraswns. 
:1. Ap]wllant, tlw d('('PdPnfs iwphP\\·, would t<•sti f~· 
m the same manm•r as .Judg(• Hansen. Additionall>·, Jw 
\rould testify that he saw the dt>r<><l('nt and hi~; wi I'<· 
frequently from ] 920 on; that they <'Xprf'SSt'd affection 
for him. After the der<•dent's wifo di Pd in 19-1-9, decedent 
and appellant visited six or SPY<'n tinws a y<•ar in Los 
Angeles or Salt Lak<> Cit>·· Forty-onp lett<>rs written 
hy dec<•dent to app<'llant and his \Yifo lwtm'<'n 1 '.)-U and 
195~ ar<> attaclwd to th<> Offn of Proof. Appellant arnl 
df•('(•d<'nt fr(•qw·ntly took trip:-; tog·ptlwr. D!'C<'(;( i:t said 
l:i 
he never saw any of his other relatives, except on one 
occasion. Decedent said he felt alienated from the rest 
of his family because his father had disinherited him, 
but appellant's father (the decedent's brother) gave 
decedent the share decedent would otherwise have re-
ceived under their father's will, that such provided the 
foundation for decedent's estate and that appellant's 
father having died, the only way decendent could express 
his gratitude would be in the Will he would draw. 
Reference is made to the Off er of Proof for further 
<ldails of the foregoing. 
After rejecting the Offer of Proof, the District 
Court then made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law ( R. 309-310), and in Finding No. 2 found that 
the Court by its Order of Partial Distribution dated 
February 24, 1959, distributed the residue of decedent's 
estate to the appellant Fred R. Wallich: 
'' ... to be held and used by him together with 
the income therefrom during the period of five 
vears after the date of the death of the testator, 
in his sole and absolute discretion and ·without 
restriction or control of any kind whatsoever, to 
meet any emergencies that may arise in and for 
the use and benefit of the \Vallich family, and 
at the end of said five-year period, said Fred R. 
\Vallich, or his 8Uccesor Trustre should he be 
deceased, should distribute any of the trust fund 
that might then be on hand to their lwirs-at-law 
of Clan<lins \Vallieh then living." 
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As Conclusions of Law, the Court recited that appel-
lant, as said testamentary trustee, should be required 
to fully account and upon said accounting should be 
ordered to distribute to said heirs-at-law all of the trust 
funds on hand at the expiration of said five-year period 
as shown by the accounting approved by the Court. 
Based upon said Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the ,Court made its Order and Decree dated 
,January 28, 1966 (R. 312-313) ordering appellant, as 
testamentary trustee, ·within thirty days, to fully ac-
count and that upon approval of the accounting the 
appellant, as testamentary trustee, be ordered to deliver 
the trust fund, if any there be, to said heirs-at-law. 
This appeal is prosecuted from said Order and 
Derree. 
SFMlVfARY OF APPELLAN'P'S CONTEN11 IONR 
AS TO GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL 
The ap1wllant presents the follo·wing summary of 
grounds for reversal of said Order and Decree, each of 
·which will be thereafter argued and presented in detail: 
POINT I 
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION CANNOT BE 
IMPEACHED BY THE WILL. 
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A decree of distribution under a will supersedes the 
will and becomes the final and conclusive adjudication 
of the testamentary disposition made by the decedent 
and the validity, interpretation and effect of each pro-
vision in the will and this is true even though the decree 
is erroneous or inaccurate in respect to specific provi-
sions in the will and the will cannot be used to impeach 
the decree of distribution. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION AP-
PELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE. 
The Decree of Distribution of February 24, 1959, 
constitutes an outright bequest of the residue of appel-
lant, is free from ambiguity and does not create a trust. 
Said decree does not incorporate paragraph 8 of the 
\Vill by reference. 
POINT III 
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION, AP-
PELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT AND 
CANNOT NOW BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT. 
Assuming that the Order of Partial Distribution of 
Fehruarv 24 1959 incor1iorates the provisions of para-. ' ' 
graph 8 of the \Vill, it incorporates all of the provisions 
and, as incorporated, each and every provision by that 
adjudication is final and conclusive even though it may 
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b<~ erroneous. This includes the prov1srnn m the .. \Yill 
that no accounting may he required of appellant, as 
trustee. The Court may not now enforce some of the 
provisions of paragraph S of the \Vill and disregard 
other provisions. Therefore, the provi1'ion of para-
graph 8 of the \Vill to the effect that aPlwllant slia11 
not be required to account ·was adjudicated in the Order 
of Distrihution and "-as conclusive even though it may 
ht· PlTOneous. The District Court erred in ordering 
appellant to account, in contravrntion of the Orc1<•r of 
Distribution. 
POINT lV 
APPELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE UNDER THE 
WILL. 
Assuming that paragraph 8 of tlw ·will \nts ineor-
poratt•d in the Decree of Distribution, ('Ven without the 
aid of extrinsic evidence, paragraph S of the \Vill <l<ws 
not ereatP a trust but is an outright gift of the rPsidue 
or an estate for years in appellant. 
POINT V 
THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN EXCLUDING PA ROLE EVIDENCE IN 
INTERPRETING IT. 
Assuming that the Decree of Distribution of F('lirn-
ary :z+, 19rl9 d<ws inrorporate thP provisions of para-
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graph 8 of the Will, the result is to create many ambigu-
ities concerning the intent of the testator as to what he 
meant by paragraph 8 and some of the provisions of 
paragraph 8 are in conflict with other of its provisions. 
Under these circumstances it was error for the District 
Court to sustain respondents' objection to the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence offered for the purpose of 
interpreting paragraph 8 and resolving the ambiguities 
and conflicts so that the intent of the testator would be 
ascertained, declared and enforced. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO RE-
QUIRE APPELLANT TO ACCOUNT. 
It was error to order appellant to account in viola-
tion of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Will, at 
least in the absence of proof on the part of respondents 
that the alleged trustee was guilty of fraud. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO ASSERT 
HE IS NOT A TRUSTEE. 
Neither of the receipts signed by appellant are rele-
vant because they were executed after the entry of the 
Decree of Distribution and cannot impeach or modify a 
judgment which has become final. There is no evidence 
that the respondents <'hanged their position in reliance 
tl1<'l'POn to their detriment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION CANNOT BE 
IMPEACHED BY THE WILL. 
The law applicable is clearly set forth in 34 C. J. S. 
conunencing at page 456 (Executors and Administrators, 
paragraph 529) as follows: 
"A decree of distribution under a \Yill is a 
final and conclusive adjudication of the testa-
mentary disposition made by decedent of his 
property, the validity, meaning, interpn~tation, 
and effect of the will and particular provisions 
thereof, the property covered by the will, the 
rights of legatees and devisees, see supra this 
section and subdivision, and incidental questions 
necessarily involved in the determination of the 
foregoing matters; and this is true even though 
the decree may be erroneous m inaccurate in 
respect of specific provisions of the will, as the 
will is only evidence on which tlw court pass<·s 
in rendering the decree, it is merged in the decn'<', 
and rannot he used to impearh it, ... '' 
The authorities cited in support of this proposition 
are numerous and fully support the text. It is only 
nc-icessarv to refer to. a few of the supporting- authorities. 
In C'ook v. Cook, 111 P. :Zd iU:2 (Cal., rn-n) tli<> \\'ill 
prnvided as follows: 
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"I am leaving 40% of what I possess to my 
son Nelson, knowing that he will pay his sister 
the $40.00 a month ref erred to, or more, if he is 
able." 
. The Decree of Distribution distributed 40% of the 
estate to Nelson without including any provision requir-
ing him to pay any sum to his sister. The sister then 
brought action claiming the son took the property as 
trustee under the provision in the Will for the payment 
of the $40.00 a month. 
The Court held that the failure to include in the 
Decree of Distribution any language declaring that the 
property was distributed in trust was a conclusive and 
final adjudication, that there was no trust for the sister 
and, rightly or wrongly, the sister was barred from 
going behind the Decree of Distribution. Held: 
"If there is a will the court must pass upon 
the validity of the disposition attempted by the 
testator, and the decree of distribution is con-
clusive thereof. 
"The decree is necessarily a judicial con-
struction of the will and fixes the several interests 
of the distributees by designating the persons 
and the proportions or parts to which each is 
entitled and is conclusive thereof. Legacies not 
mentio~ed in the decree are cut off. A claim of 
interest upon a legacy should be asserted in the 
proceeding for distribution, and a distribution 
without interest is a determination that the 
legatee is entitled to none. 
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"The will is merely a part of the evidence 
upon which the decree is based, and becomes 
merged in and superseded by the decree, tbe 
decree becoming the measure of the rights of the 
beneficiaries and the law of the estate. The de-
cree therefore is conclusive as against collateral 
attack, even though in contravention of the terms 
of the will. In other words, the will cannot be 
used to impeach the decree." 
The same principle was applied to the opposite 
factual situation in Shattuck v. Shattuck, 192 P.2d 229 
(Ariz. 1948). There, the Will specifically provided for 
the residue to be distrihut<>d in trust to a named trustee 
for the testator's children. 
At the conclusion of administration, the t>state vvas 
distributed pursuant to the "'\Yill by the Decree of Dis-
tribution which r<"rited as foHows: 
"To Spencer S. Shattuck as trust("e of the 
Lemuel C. Shattuck trust; 
"All the rest and residue of said property 
and estate to be held in trust as providl'<l under 
the last "Will and Testament of Lemuel C. Shat-
tuck as above described ... be, and the same is 
hereby distributed to Spencer S. Shattuck as 
Trustee, above mentioned, and to be handled hy 
him in accordance with the trust provisions of 
the Last \Vill and Testament of LP1m1el C. Shat-
tuck." 
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One of the heirs claimed that the trust created by the 
\Vill ~was invalid and that tlw residue should pass accord-
ing to the laws of intestate succession. The Court held 
that the Decree of Distribution was final and conclusive 
<>ven if enoneous and that the validity of the trust 
created by the Decree \Yas rPs adjudicata. Held: 
"The will has been probated, the estate dis-
tributed, and the proceedings in probate ended 
by a final decree. . . . A decree of distribution 
supersedes the will and prevails over the provi-
sions thereof and the will becomes merged 
in the decree, which itself becomes the measure 
of the rights of the beneficiaries and the law of 
the estate (Citing many authorities). 
* * * * * 
"It is generally held also that a will may not 
Le used to impeach a decree of final distribution, 
hut may he used only in aid of it. (Citing authori-
ties) 
"The power and jurisdiction conferred upon 
the Superior Court sitting in probate includes the 
power of the probate court to construe the will 
of the decedent, the ascertainment of the persons 
,vho succeed to the property of the estate, and 
the validity and effect to be given the language 
of the will, and this in the exerci:w of its original 
and exclusive jurisdiction. 
* * * * * 
"All probate proce>edings and judg1m~nts 
rendered therein are in the nature of proceedings 
in rem, and a final decree of distribution has th<~ 
force and effect of a judgment in r<'m. 
* * * * * 
2'2 
"A decree of final distribution is a judicial 
construction of a will, conclusive upon all heirs, 
devisees and legatees, and immune from collateral 
attack unless it is void on its facf'. 
* * * * * 
"The will attempted to create a trust which, 
considered by itself, u·as no dmtbt invalid under 
the rule declared in the Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 
the decree, which itself becomes the mt>aslUP 
523, 60 P. 442, 64 P. 1000, 84 Am.St.Rep. 70. The 
validity of the trust is, hou·ever, no longer open to 
qustion. The decree of the superior court distriu-
11ting the residuP of the estate to trustees upon 
certain trusts is a. conclusive adjudication of thP 
validity of the disposition made by tlw testator. 
(citing cases). And it is equally conclusivt> as an 
ascertainment and adjudication of the tenus of the 
trust, and of the rights of all parties claiming any 
legal or equitable interest under the will. (citing 
cases). The decree s1.1persedes the will and vre-
vails 'over any provision therein which may ue 
thought inconsistent with the decree.' (citing 
casPs). In determining tlw rights of thP wid<rw, we 
are, therefore, to look, not to the terms of the 11'ill, 
but to those of the decree of distribution.'' ( l<~m­
phasis added) 
Jn Re TVaU.a-ce's Estate. 219 P.2d 910 (Cal. J0f'>O) 
held: 
"It is settled by a long line of authorities 
that under the doctrine of rt>s adju<licata a will 
cannot be looked to for the purpose of impeaching 
or contradicting the plain and unambiguous llro-
vision in a Decree of Distribution mH.'P tl1P Dt>cn·P 
has hecomf' final." 
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In Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Conipany, 17 Ut. 
2d 88; 404 P.2d 675, this Court recently held: 
"The probate of the estate was a proceeding 
in rem and the decree after the time for appeal 
expired became final and conclusive and it no.t 
subject to attack, except for fraud." 
See also Bindley v. Mitchell, (Kan. 1951) 228 P.2d 
689 and In re Lo rings Estate (Cal. 1946) 175 P.2d 524. 
In the latter, the Court said at page 529: 
"It is settled, however, that, once final, an 
erroneous decree of distribution, like any other 
erroneous judgment, is as conclusive as a decree 
that contains no error." 
It is therefore established that the Decree of Distri-
bution is a final judgment, conclusive on all matters 
contained therein even though erroneous which cannot 
he~ impeached or modified by reference to the -Will. 
For the same reason the Decree of Distribution can-
not be impeached or modified by reference to the two 
"Re>ceipts of Distrilmtee" (R. 199-201) signed by the 
appellant after the entry of the Decree. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION AP-
PELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE. 
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The Order of Partial Distribution of February 2-1-, 
1966, was made and entered after petition by the Execu-
tor, "'\Valker Bank & Trust Company, after notice to all 
heirs, and after \Vritten Stipulation thereto between the 
Executor and respondent A. C. vVallirh. rrhe Petition 
of Walker Bank, Exe>cutor, the Stipulation of A. C. 
\Vallich, and the Order of Distribution itself a1l entirely 
omitted any refen'nce to a "trust." lnstPad, tlw Order 
of Partial Distribution distributed the residue of the 
estate to appellant ((to be held nnd 11scd uy hi1n in his 
discretion in accordance with and pursuant to the pro-
visions of paragraph 8 of tlw \Vill :" (R. 62). 
The Decree did not designate the distribution as 
one in trust nor the appellant as a trustee, nor did it 
name any beneficiaries in whom is vested tlw right to 
Pnforce tlw trust, nor did it mention a trust pm·po~w. 
nor a time period. rrh(~ residue was distrilmted to app<'l-
lant to he held and used hy him in his discr<-'tion. 
Paragraph 6 of the Order of Partial Distribution 
is entirely free from ambiguitiPs. lt is only when refrr-
Pnre is made to paragraph 8 of tlw -Will that aml>iguit.Y 
ran be imporkd into the Ordt•r of Distrilmtion arnl it 
has been established in Point I that the terms of tlH· 
Decree of Distribution rannot he impeaehed lw refrrPnrt• 
tn tlw vVill. 
The Stipulation upon ·whieh r<>spondPnt A. C. \\' a1-
lirl1 's ohjertions to tlJ<• Petition for Partial Tfo·il'ilmtion 
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were resolved, subparagraph (l)(e), (R. 50), unequi-
vocally provides for the distribution of the residue to 
appellant without any reference to the language in para-
graph 8 of the Will and shows that the parties did not 
intend that a trust would be created. No other heirs 
objected to the Petition for Partial Distribution, though 
all had notlce (R. 48), and none now claim lack of notice. 
The Order of Partial Distribution is in substantial 
accord with the Stipulation but with the addition of the 
words, "in accordance with and pursuant to the provi-
sions of paragraph 8 o.f the Will." The Stipulation 
describes appellant merely as the residuary beneficiary. 
Neither the Court nor the parties intended the lan-
guage, "in accordance with and pursuant to the pro-
visions of paragraph 8 of the Will" as incorporating the 
forms of paragraph S of the vVill into the Order of 
Partial Distribution as words of limitation. 
The Stipulation of the parties upon which the Order 
of Partial Distribution was based clearly does not con-
template any limitation in the bequest of the residue. 
Paragraph 15 (R. 57-Gl) of the Order of Partial 
Distribution dated February 24, 1959 distributes fifteen 
separate specific bequests to various beneficiaries and in 
t·aeh subparagraph the Court recites that the bequest 
is distrihutt'<l, "undt'r tlw provisions of paragraph 4 
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of the Will of the deceased." rrhis language was not 
used by the Court fo.r the purpose of limiting the rights 
of the fifteen distribute(-'S or for the purpose of incor-
porating into the Order of Distribution the language of 
paragraph 4 of the Will. The use of similar language 
in paragraph 15(q) (R. Gl) of the Order distributing 
the residue to appellant, cannot be construed to have 
any different meaning as to appellant than the reference 
to paragraphs in the 'Nill in distributing the fifteen 
specific bequests. 
If there is any doubt concernmg the intention of 
the Court in the Order of Partial Distribution of Febru-
ary 24, 1959, that doubt can be resolved by ref Prence to 
the Final Decree of Distribution of :May 10, 19GO, para-
graph 3, (R. 220) wherein the Court upon Pt>tition by 
the Executor, Walker Bank, orderPd, "that the remaining 
assets of the estate ... he immediately distributed and 
paid by the executor to Fred R. \Vallich, the rrsiduar_\· 
beneficiary of the vVill of the de<'<'.ased." 
This Final Decree of Distribution unequivocall~· 
designates the appellant as the residuary lwnefician· 
without limitation. It is aJlparent that tlw Court in 
this Final Decree did not regard paragraph 8 of tlw 
\Vill to have been incorporatod by rt>fen'llC(' into tliP 
Partial DPcree of Distribution dated Fehrnar.'· '..?-!, 1959. 
11he words in the Partial Decree of Distribution "in 
accordance with and pnrsnant to paragraph 8 of the 
Will" an' d(•scriptive only ancl not lirnitatimn;. 
This Court has previously held in another case that 
as a matter of law the words in a Decree of Distribution 
following that portion of the Order distributing the 
residue without limitation and adding, "in accordance 
with the Last Will of the deceased" are descriptive only 
and do not impose limitations or conditions upon the 
unconditional language disposing of the residue. 
In Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Compa;ny, 17 
Utah 2d 88, 404 P.2d 675 (1966), the Will bequeathed 
the residue to the appellant, "and I do this acknowledg-
ing all my children hereinafter named and for the reason 
that I know that my beloved wife will care for my 
children from the remainder of my estate, if there be 
any, share alike." 
In the probate proceedings the Decree of Distribu-
tion distributed the residue to the wife with the addition 
of the phrase that the residue was distributed, "in 
accordance with the last Will and testament of the 
dPceased." 
The wife later died and left the residue of the estate 
shP had received by said DPcrPe to one of her children 
to the exclusion of the others. The disinherited children 
claimed that the phrase, "in accordance with the Will" 
had the t'ffect of incorpo·rating the terms of the Will 
which in turn imposed a trust upon thf' property for 
thP benefit of all the children. 
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The District Court ruled m accordance with this 
contention and distributed the property one-fourth to 
ea.ch of the children. 
This Court unanimously reversed and held that the 
words "in accordance with the terms of the Will" did 
not impose any conditions or restrictions on the Decn'l' 
of Distribution. Held: 
"We are constrained to disagree with the 
position espoused by the plaintiffs. The decree 
is clear enough in its terms. It unequivocally 
distributes the property in question to Nettie 
Knudsen Miller, and there is nothing uncertain 
or ambiguous in its doing so. The fact that it 
adds the recital, 'that [the decree] is in accord-
ance with the last will and testament of the 
deceased' amounts only to a declaration of tlw 
basis for making the distribution, but it does not 
impose any condition or restriction upon the 
effect of the distribution. The probate~ of the 
estate was a proceeding in rem and the decn·P 
after the time for appeal expirrd heca1rn~ final 
and conclusive and is not subject to attaek, Pxcept 
for frand. 
"Further persuading us to the conclm;ion ~we 
have reached is the fact that it is extremely doubt-
ful that the language of the \\·ill would justify a 
conclusion that a trust was intended. Rat]1er tlw 
language seems to indiratP clearly an int<>nti011 
hy the testator to leave to his ~wife all of his 
1)foperty to he used in acrordaneP with lH'r judg·-
rn0nt." 
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It is submitted that the Miller case is controlling 
in the case at bar. 
The Decree of Distribution in Miller orders distri-
bution of the estate to the wife "in accordance with the 
last ~will and testament of the deceased." 
1The Decree of Distribution in the case at bar orders 
the residue of the estate distributed to appellant, "to be 
held and used by him in his discretion .... " So far this 
is an outright and unlimited gift. Then follow the words, 
" ... in accordance with and pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph 8 of the Will.'' 
There is no significant difference in the language 
used in the two cases. The addition of "pursuant to" 
to "in accordance with" in the case at bar does not in 
any way change the meaning of the language as being 
idPntical with the Miller case. 
rrhe parallel to the M1'llcr case lS too clear to be 
nvoided. 
McGavin v. San Francisco P.0.A. Society, (Cal. 
1917) 1G7 P. 182, held that a decrf'e of distribution 
would not be set aside, even though property was dis-
t ri huted to thf' wrong beneficiary through mistake of 
law made by the executor's attorney, sincf' thf' mistake 
\\'as not extrinsir. The Court said: 
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" ... a decree of distribution is a judgment in 
rem, and, although erroneous, is as conclusive 
against one who fails to appear, having the oppor-
tunity so to do, as it is against a party whose 
fault produced the error." 
"Fraud or mistake is extrinsic when it de-
prives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to 
present his case to the court. TV estphal v. West-
phal, Cal. 126 P.2d 105, 107; Cardozo v. Bank of 
America, (Cal. 1953) 254 P.2d 949." 
'80 here, respondent A. C. W allich expressly stipu-
lated to the decree and all other respondents here had 
notice of hearing and opportunity to object before the 
decree was entered, but did not do so. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the language in the 
Order of Partial Distribution dated February 24, 1959, 
"in accordance with and pursuant to paragraph S of the 
last will of said deceased," amounts only to a declaration 
of the basis for making the distribution but does not 
impose any conditions or restrictions upon the effect o t• 
the distribution. 
If the Order of Partial Distribution dated February 
24, 1959 is construed as creating a trust as to that part 
of the estate then distributed, it is clear that the Decree 
of Final Distribution dated :May 10, 1960, is an unlimited 
:rnd unconditional distribution of the then residue of 
the estate and we will be faced with the anamolous situ-
ation of having the appellant receive under the sarnP 
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clause of the Will a portion of the estate in trust and 
other portions of the estate frpe of the trust. 
It is, therefore, concluded that neither Decree pur-
ported to create a trust but each vested the entire bene-
ficial interest in the distributee so that said Decrees are 
final and conclusive and cannot be impeached by refer-
Pnce to the Will. 
Finding No. 2 ( R. 309) is the ultimate finding upon 
which the District Court's Order & Decree of January 
28, 1966 is based. This Finding clearly violates the 
foregoing rules of law by using the Will to impeach 
the Decree of Partial Distribution. 
This finding reads as follows: 
"2. On February 2-1:, 1959 this court did make 
and enter its order distributing to Fred R. Wal-
lich as testamentary trustee the rest, residue and 
remainder of the estate to be held and used by 
him together with the income therefrom during 
the period of five years after the date o.f the 
death of the testator, in his sole and absolute 
discretion and without restriction or control of 
any kind whatsoever, to meet any emergencies 
that may arise in and for the use and benefit of 
the vVallich family, and at the end of said five 
year period, said Frc•d R. \Vallich or his succ~s­
sor trustee should he be deceased, should dis-
tribute any of the trust fund that might then be 
on hand to the heirs at law of Claudius \Vallich 
then living upon thr principal of represPntation." 
(R. 309-:ilO) 
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Hence, jt is dear that Finding No. 2, upon which 
the Order & Decree appealed from is bas('d, is in error. 
To be correct, the Finding should reach the opposite 
result, that is, that the Order of Partial Distrjbution 
of February 24, 1959, distributed the residue outright 
to appellant. The District Court's Order of January 28, 
1966 should be reversed and the case remanded to the 
District Court with instructions to enter a Decree deter-
mining that the Order of Partial Djstrihution distributed 
thr rrsidue outright to appellant. 
POINT III 
UNDER THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION, AP-
PELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT AND 
CANNOT NOW BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT. 
Finding No. 2 above quoted adopts some of tlw 
provisions from paragraph S of the vVill and adds them 
to the original Order o.f Partial Distribution of _F'ehru-
ary 24, 1959, but rejects other important portions of 
paragraph S of the "Will. If it be determined that the 
Order of Distribution did incorporate paragraph 8 of 
the vVill, it must incorporate all of its teTrns - not 
merely some of them. 
The significant portion of paragraph S of the \Vill 
which was omitted from the Order of January :.28, 196() 
appealed from is the last sentence reading- as follow~~, 
"~f y said neplww in the administration of t11e trn~t 
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herein imposed upon him shall act without the necessity 
of furnishing any bond or any other security and with-
01lt the necessity of making any accounting of any natitre 
whatsoever to any person or zJarty concrrnin.r; the adm1:11-
istration of this triist." 
If paragraph 8 of the \Vill was incorporated in the 
Order of Distribution by reference, it follows that it 
also incorporated the provision that no accounting what-
soever be required. As thus incorporated, the Order 
of Distribution has become the final and conclusive 
monument as to the rights and duties of the parties and 
c·annot now he modified, even though Prroneous. 
It follows that Finding No. 2 is not supported by 
the evidence. The evidence is paragraph 8 of the Will 
and Finding· No. 2 adopts only a portion of it. 
It, therefore, follows that the Order appealed from, 
in::mfar as it requires an accounting by tlw appellant, 
is contrary to the final and conclusive Order of Partial 
Distribution dated Ft>hruary 24, 1959, and the Order 
must he rPversed. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT IS NOT A TRUSTEE UNDER THE 
WILL. 
Assuming- that paragraph 8 of the ·will was incor-
porated in the OrdPr of Partial Distrihntion, tlwn evPn 
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without the aid o.f extrinsic evidence, paragraph 8 of 
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the Will does not create a trust but is an outright gift 
to appellant or an estate for years in appellant. 
The following quotations from Restatement of 
Trusts, Second, are applicable: 
"~ 125, If property is tranf erred to a person to 
h~~ disposed of by him in any manner or to any 
person he may select, no trust is created and 
the transferee takes the property for his o-wn 
benefit. 
"(a) The general rule. vVhether the tram1feror 
has manifested an intention to give the property 
to a person in trust or to give it to him for his 
own benefit is a question of interpretation of the 
transferor's languagp in the light of all th<• rll'-
cumstances. 
"No trust is created if the transferor does not 
manifest an intention to impose enforcPable duties 
upon the transferee .... (No trust is creatPd) 
if settlor manifests an intention to impos<~ merely 
a moral obligation, and to leave the transfen·P 
free from any legal obligation to apply the prop-
(•rty to the purpose. His intention not to imposP 
enforceable duties may appear from the fact that 
the purposes to which the property is to Le ap-
plied are so broad as to. shmv that the transferor 
intended that the transferee should be Pntitled 
to use the pro1wrty for his own benPfit. 
"(b) If the tranferor manifests an intention to 
give the property to a person for his own lwnPfit, 
no trust arises and the transferee may (1o as 11<~ 
likes with the property. 
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"Illustration 2. A bequeaths $100 000 to B to be 
d. ' ' isposed of to such persons and in such manner 
and in such sum or sums of money as he in his 
discretion shall think proper. B takes the money 
for his own benefit." 
"§ 187 (k) Discretion of Trustee, 
"It is true the powers conferred upon a tr(ltn,S-
f eree may be so extensive as to indica.te an 
intention not to create a trust but to give 
the beneficial interest in the property to the 
transferee." 
"§ 172( d) Duty to Account, 
" ... The language of the trust instrument, 
however, may manifest am intent that the 
property should be held free of trust, in 
which case the (tr an sf eree) is the beneficial 
owner and incurs no liability no matter what 
use or disposition he makes of the property." 
Hence, the basis for decision becomes : Does this 
vVill show intent to impose enforcea7Jle d1tties on the 
donee? The \.Vill here manifests lack of imposition of 
Pnfo.rceahlP duties in the following respects: 
1. Discretion. The \Vill says "sole and absolute" 
discrrtion and "without rPstrietion or control of any 
kind whatsoever." Such hroad discretion negates an 
Pnforc<'ahle duty 1wr Restatement of Trusts, §187 (k). 
36 
2. Purpose. The purpose of the alleged trust is 
very, very vague and broad. By ~125, Restatement of 
Trusts, such broad purpose negates manifestation of 
enforceable duties. Th("' words, "emPrgency," "reserve'' 
and "family" are vague and hroad in themselves. N ok 
also the trust purpose is not limited to emergencies. 
The vVill says " ... emergencies that may arise in, mu! 
for the use and benefit of, the \Vallich family, ... " 
The words "and for the use and benefit of" have no 
meaning whatever if the trust purpose is construrd to 
he limited to emergencies. By 74-2-9, U.C.A. 1953, every 
("'Xpression in the will is to he given some effect, if 
possible. Therefore, the purprnse of this allPged trust 
is also "for the use and benefit of the \Vallich family,'' 
whirh is so broad as to Pntirely negate intent to cn•att> 
an enf01·reable duty. 
:3. Accounting. ThP \Vill wmves accountings and 
honds. By ~172 ( d), RestatPment of Trusts, such negatPs 
pnforceahle duty. 
4. Beneficiaries. "Family, that is, my blood rda-
tions, regardless of their degree of kindn•d or relation-
ship to me," "HPirs-at-LmY." The \Yill is ver)T vagne 
as to defining beneficiaries. \Vhy leave a ·will at all if 
the bulk of the estate goes to one's heirs~ "Of t\rn modz•s 
of interpreting a will, that is to be pn•fened y, 11 ieli 
·will prevrnt a total intestacy," 7 -1:-:2-10, r.C.,\. l!l:J:L 
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5. Inconsistency. This Will provides : 
" ... To Fred R. Wallich, In ·Trust, nevertheless, 
(1) to be held and used by him in his sole and 
absolute discretion and without restriction or 
control of any kind whatsoever ... as a reserve 
... for the use and benefit of ... family . . . , 
(2) said fund ... to be held and used by my 
said nephew . . . for 5 years . . . and . . . my 
said nephew ... shall distribute any part of the 
Trust fund that may then be on hand ... to my 
heirs ... " (numerals added). 
rrhe second and entirely independent clause after the 
seniicolon creates no trust purpose and expressly says 
the fund may be "held and used by my nephew" and not 
for anyone else's benefit during 5 years. 
6. Disinheritance. Paragraphs G and 9 of the "'Will 
specifically disinherit heirs not specifically named. The 
testator can hardly have intended by paragraph 8 to 
create an enforceable duty under paragraph 8 to distrib-
ute the remainder of the alleged trust to "heirs-at-law" 
whom he has disinherited. 
7. "Any Part." The clause, "shall distribute any 
part of tlie 'rnrnt fund that may he then on hand" in 
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the Will recognizes expressly there may be no funds 
at all at the end of five years. 
8. Term. The Will says : " ... to be held and used 
by my said nephew until his death or for a period of 
five ( 5) years after the date of my death, whichever 
shall first occur." Only appellant can "hold and use" 
the fund. The testator would not have limited the term 
to the appellant's life unless he intended the appellant 
to use the funds himself for five years, which negates 
a trust. Restatement of Tntsts, Second, §125(b). 
The following authorities are applicable: 
Collins v. JJ1osher, 91 F.2d 582 (C.iC.A. 9th, 1937). 
The \Vill gave property to the son and daughter, in 
trust, to be managed and controlled, as they deemed hest 
for the beneficiaries, without the jntervention of any 
court and without other authority than their own and 
after the payment o.f specific bequests that the residue 
be distributed to the son and daughter. It provided that 
if a vacancy occurred in the trusteeship the Court should 
appoint successors and waived bond. 
The Decree of Distribution in the probate court 
awarded the property to the son and daughter, "as the 
will directed to be done." The son and daughter divided 
the property between themselves. After the death of 
the son, the assignee of one of his children commenced 
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action against the surviving daughter. The daughter 
testified that her mother named them as trustees for 
convenience so that they could convey title without the 
signature of their spouses. "My mother's main idea as 
she expressed to me was that when we were gone - that 
she wanted the land to go and descend to her blood heirs 
... these being the trust beneficiaries of her will." 
Plaintiff claimed a trust was created for the bene-
fit of testator's heirs at law. 
Held: No tntst. 
"A 'trust' is 'a fiduciary relationship with respect 
to property, subjecting the person by whom the 
property is held to equitable duties to deal with 
the property for the benefit of another person, 
which arises as a result of a manifestation of an 
intention to create it.' Restatement of the Law 
of Trusts, Section 2. So far as shown there is 
no equitable duty resting on respondent to hold 
or deal with the property in question for the bene-
fit of another person." (emphasis added). 
In Axtell v. Coous, 89 So. 419 (Fla.) the will pro-
vidtid: 
''I do give, devise and bequeath unto my hm;band 
.James N. Coons, as trustee for my granddaughter 
Patricia Crossman and Josephine Crossman, lwr 
mother, sharp and sharp alikP, all of my propert:v 
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. I do give him full power to manage, control, 
sell, mortgage, encumber or lease jn any way ht~ 
may desire ... I do direct that he be not required 
to render or make any accounting to any court 
... I do direct that my daughter-in-law, Josephine 
Crossman, do succeed to the said James N. Coons, 
as trustee ... not required to give any bond or 
make any accounting." 
It was held that the broad powers of management 
and disposition coupled with the requirement that the 
trustee be not obliged to account negated intent to creatE> 
an enforceable trust and in spite of the use of the word 
"trustee" in the Will Co-0ns took the bequest free of any 
trust obligations. The Court said: 
"Except for the itse of the word 'trustee,' ire fail 
to discover anything in the will to indicate the 
piirpose of creating a trust for the benefit of any 
cestui que tru,st. It is contrary to the conCl:'ption 
<lind purpose of a trust that the person designated 
as trustee be given absolute and imrestrninNl 
control over the property with the right to sell 
and use the proceeds of the sale a,s he may see 
fit without liability or accountalJility to a cestui 
que trust. The purpose of a trust is to provjde 
some one to hold and manage the trust pro1wrty 
or funds derjved therefrom for the benefit of 
some person or persons to whom he shall b<• 
accountable, not only for the specific trust prop-
erty, but for the proceeds of its sale, its accre-
tions, its earnings, and any and all funds coming 
into his hands from, by, or through the propert_\' 
of which he is the trustee. (Coons) \\'HS qice11 
possession, control, tlu,, be1u'ficial 11se and o!Jsol11fr 
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and 'Uncontrolled .doniinion over the property. 
Sitch power def eats the creation of a tntst for the 
benefit of any one else ,a.nd the mere designating 
of Coons as trustee is not sufficient to die,stroy 
the palpable pitrpose of the will to place the 
property in the control in Coons for his personal 
use and benefit, with the e.xpress provision em-
powering him to dispose of the property without 
coitrt authority, and without accoimtabdity to the 
sitpposed cestitis que trust. 
"One of the essential elements of a trust is that 
the trustee shall hold the property for a 'specified 
or ascertainable ohjeet.' Another rule governing 
trusts is that -
'The disposition of the property must also 
be definitely stated; there can be no valid trust 
unless it is capable of being enforeed even against 
the wish of the trustee; a mere honorary obliga-
tion which the trustee may perform or not at his 
will does not create a trust .... '" (Emphasis 
added) 
In Pon::dino v. Pon ::elino, 26 N.vV.2d 330 (Iowa) 
tlw trust granted the trustee broad powers, similar to 
tltP ahoYe. The Court held the entire beneficial interest 
in the trust \Yas vested in the trustPP free of any trust 
obligations, saying: 
"A trust 'lS not created imless the scttlor mani-
fests an intention to inipose Hpon the transferee 
·duties irhich are enforcealJle in the courts. Re-
strdemc11t, Trusts, RPction 25, Section 125, eom-
m0nt a; ... Ind0ed a trust is definPd as a fiduci-
ary relationship with respect to property, suh-
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jecting the person by whom the property is held 
to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit 
of another .... 
"A corolla.ry to the rule that a trust involves 
the imposition of enforceable duties ·upon the 
transferee is that there is nu property which can 
be the subject of a tnist where its application 
to the purposes of the trust depends upon the 
a·bosolute and unconditional discretion of the per-
son in control of the property. Obviously a court 
of equity cannot direct what disposition one shall 
make O·f property which is given to him to dispose 
of as he chooses. Unbridled discretion in a trustee 
not only negatives the necessary separation of 
legal and equitable ownerships, but is also objec-
tionable, so far as the existence of a trust is 
concerned, by reason of the uncertainty it in-
volves ... See also Restatement, Trusts, Sfctio11 
125. 
" 'While a trust is valid where it is imperative 
as to the amount to be used for the beneficiary, 
where the amounts, if any, which the beneficiaries 
are to receive are wholly discretionar:v with tlw 
alleged trustee, the trust is too uncertain to h<" 
t>nforceable.' 65 C .. J. 273, Section 53." 
In N onnan v. Prince, 101 A. 12G ( H.l.) tlw residu<:> 
of the estate was left in trust "to pay the remaining or 
ninth share of income, in '"hole or in part, at sueh time 
or times as the trustee shall seleet to testator's said son 
Hugh or to Hugh's wjfe or to any ehild or ehildren of 
Hugh, or to any other pt>rson or persons whosOPY<>r a;-; 
tlw trustee for the time being in its uncontrollc->d ah-
;-;olute disrrPtio.n or pleasurP of said trnsteP shall S<'r> fit:• 
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It was held that the ninth share did not create a 
trust because the Will imposed no enforceable obliga-
tion upon the trustees. Held: 
"Said provision imposes no trust or obligation 
with respect to the disposition of said ninth share 
of income ... 
"From the very broad language of the provision 
as to the disposition of the said ninth share of 
net income the testator's intent can readily be 
found not to bequeath said share in trust for 
indefinite beneficiaries; bitt the provision should 
be regarded rather as a beqitest of said share to 
the trustees with an arbitra.ry power of disposi-
tion. The use of the words 'trustee' and 'trustees' 
in this clause of the will is not controlling as to 
his or their character in the disposition of said 
ninth share, but said words must be regarded as 
descriptive .... " 
Under the foregoing authorities, this \Vill, therefore, 
rreated an outright gift of the residue in appellant, or 
at least the \Vill creates an estate for five years with 
power to consume principal and intPrest in appellant. 
The second clause of paragraph 8 of the Will reads : 
"said fund and the income therefrom to be held 
and 1.csed lF!J my said nephew until his death or for 
a period of five yPars afkr the date of my death 
... upon the occurrence of such event my said 
nephew ... shall distribute any part of the Trust 
fund that may lJP then on hand to my heirs at law." 
44 
The use of the words ''fund and income" means 
principal and income. 
"Any part that may then be on hand" indicates 
testator's intention that some part or all of the fund 
would have been used by his nephew during this period. 
"By my said nephew" indicates a use of the prop-
Prty for the benefit of the nephew and not for oth0rs. 
rrhis second clausP obviously creates a use for five 
years ~with power to invade and use the entire principal 
vested in appellant. To construe the \Vill as an absolut<~ 
trust is to ignore this second clause. Instead, the second 
clause modifies and expands the trust provisions in the 
first clause to reflect a trust for five years with interim 
power in the trustee to use the principal and interest 
himself for five years and thereafter to pay over the 
halance, if any, to tlw named beneficiaries. This is 
identical, except for tl>rm, to the often recognized trnst 
duties in a life estate with pO"wer to nse principal arnl 
int<>n'st in the trustPe for his lifr. 
rro the extent it is argued the two elanses are 11"-
reconcilable and the first controls, tlwn 7-1--2-~. F.C.A. 
1958 applies: 
''All the parts of a will are to he constrn('d rn 
rPlation to Pach otlwr, and, if possihh>, so as t(I 
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form one consistent whole; but where several 
parts are absolutely irreconcilable, the later must 
prevail." 
The rules for interpreting this clause are set forth 
in 33 Arn.J ur. p. 724 as foHows: 
"The question whether the beneficiary of a life 
estate has an implied power to use the principal 
or corpus has most frequently arisen where the 
testator has used some form of expression indi-
cating an expectation that the subject of the gift 
may undergo diminution during the continuance 
of the particular estate. Accordingly, a right on 
the part of the first taker to intrench upon tlw 
principal or corpus has been inferred where the 
t,rift over is described as being of all, what, or 
so much as remains, or some very substantially 
similar expression, what is unused, not consumed, 
unexpended, or undisposed of, what is left, or 
substantially similar expressions, the residue, the 
balance, or very like terminology, the surplus, and 
all the property that may revert. Likewise, an 
inference of an intention that the first taker 
should have the right to use the corpus has been 
drawn from expressions making the gift over 
contingent upon the existence of property, as 
indicated by such expressions as if or should 
anything remain, be left, or remain unexpended." 
In In re Smythe's Estate, (Cal. 1955) 282 P.2d 141. 
Tlw \Vill ]pft the remaindPr of the estate: 
" ... to Ruth Smvthe for lwr during her lifetinw, 
as she may need. or SP<> fit to USP. If, upon her 
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death, any of my estate rernains, it is my will 
that such remainder ... (go to ap1wllants) ." 
The Court held this to be a life estate with power to use 
and consume part or all of tlw principal, saying, 
" ... If she consumes it all 'as she may need or 
see fit to use' appellants get nothinp:. If she does 
not, they get what is left." 
ln In re Nichols' Estate, (19():2) 19 Cal. Hptr. 9:L 
tlw will provided: 
"You (sister Bess and appellant) can serve as 
my executor without bond and after you get 
through with it if there is any l<:>ft see that it 
goes to our Bro. and Sisters." 
'The trial court held the will disinherited app<:>llant, tlw 
testator's only natural sisfrr, since there was no expn·s:~ 
gift to her and "011r . .. s1sters" excluded her. rl\•stimony 
was admitted that testator had said "Bess is all I haw 
and I'll alwavs take care of lwr. '' rl'he Court of Appeal 
n-'versed, holding the gift to 1-Je a life estate to Sister 
B<>ss with powPr to invade coqms to tlit' full Pxtent of 
her own nc~Pds and pleasure, ·with lTlllaiml<·r to ''Brn. 
and sisters." Jn overruling tlw confrntion that a gift to 
an executor is in his n•presentativ<> <·apacit:'>' abs<·nt clPar 
<•xpression to tlw contrar:>', the Court a1lprnv<·cl Fst:1f1' of 
l\11rl-.-eet. Cal. :rn:i P.~d :-\~Hi, \\'hieli said: 
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" the mere use of the [technical] term may 
well be deemed to crt>ate an uncertainty or am-
biguity. . . . . 
"In reading this testimony we have in mind that 
we are searching to find not only who the natural 
objects of his bounty were, but in what order of 
priority he naturally would have regarded them . 
. . . There was no testimony that the testator ever 
expressed any intent whatever to make any 
(contestants) ... beneficiaries of his estate. Nor 
is there any testimony that any of these persons 
have any need for, nor any expectation of receiv-
ing, any of his estate .... Others declined to join 
in the proceedings. The contestants, on the other 
hand, were those with the most casual contacts, 
or without any; pt>rsons with the least claims to 
his bounty." 
So, in this cas(', the grant to appellant to hold and use 
1Jrincipal and income, and to distribute any part that 
may be on hand constitutt>s, not a life estate, but an 
(':-;tate for 5 year:-;. 
Aprwllant's verified Petition for Discharge, para-
graph 7, (R. 229) alh•ges that ·within five yt>an; of the 
date of the dt>cedent's death, he disposed of the entire 
principal and income in compliance with the \Vill of the 
<l<'ct>dent. Henct>, there is nothing to account for and lw 
:-;honld lw disrharged as tf•stanH'ntary truster. 
POINT V 
THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN EXCLUDING PAROLE EVIDENCE IN 
INTERPRETING TT. 
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Assuming that the Order of Partial Distribution of 
February 2±, 1959 does incorporate thti provisions of 
paragraph 8 of the \Vill, the result is to create many 
ambiguities concerning the intent of the testator as to 
what he meant by paragraph 8. Und('r these <'ireum-
stances it was error for the District Court to sustain 
respondents' objection to the introduction of extrinsic 
<'videnc0 offered for the purpose of interpreting para-
graph 8 and resolving the ambiguities and eonfliets f\O 
that the intent of the testator would be ascertained, 
<foclan•<l and enfor<'ed. 
It is axiomatic that when a prov1s10n m a will is 
ambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence is admissible 
to explain or resolve the ambiguity. This ty1w of 
<•vidPnce includes all of the faets and circumstanc<•s 
under whi<·h the \Vill was madt', including the relation-
shi}) and disposition of thP decedent to the he1wfieiaries 
and the decedent's instructions to the scrivener, exclusive 
of his oral de<'larations of his intPntion. 7-1-2-2 F.C.A. 
J 95:3. The basic question in every instanrP is to deter-
rninP the intPnt of thP testator. 
The ambiguities and inconsistencies in tlw Will in 
tl1e int<•rprPtation of which the Court rould have lwPn 
assisted by extrinsic evidPnc<> are detailPd in tit<> Point 
TY. Perhaps the biggest arnhiguity is that which arises 
wh<>n tlw word ''trust" is used and then the \Vill pro-
<'t•eds. step liy stPp. to takP away evPI'Y ek•rnc•nt of a 
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trust in law by manifesting an intent not to impose 
enforceable duties on the appellant. If the Court had 
the assistance of extrinsic evidence, it might have con-
eluded that the testator did not intend to create a trust 
in the first instance and that the Probate Court in its 
Decree of Distribution dated Februarv 24 1959 did not . . ' 
intend to create a trust, even assuming that paragraph 
8 of the Will was incorporated by reference in the Decree. 
The extrinsic evidence offered by the appellants 
and rejected by the trial court is set forth in considerable 
detail in the Offer of Proof, Exhibit 1 in the record, and 
falls within the classification of the kind of extrinsic 
evjdence which the Court finds useful in interpreting 
·wills in order to ascertain the true intent of the testator. 
l t particularly shO'ws that appellant was the natural 
object of the decedent's bounty, that respondents were 
not, and that the decedent did not intend to create a 
tnrnt with enforct>ahle duties applicahl<• to appellant. 
lt is urged by the appellant that if the Court had 
l'Pceived tht> offered extrinsic evidt>nce, the Court might 
liavf~ concluded that although the word 'trust' appears 
i11 paragraph S, the real intt~nt of the testator was to 
make an outright gift to the appellant. 
Estate of Bandall, 49 Cal. Rptr. 280, Feb. 8, 19G6, 
l10Ms that ewn though the word used in the \Vill is 
fr<'<' from amhiguit~' in the dictionar.Y sPn:-:e it rnay hP 
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ambiguous in the sense it was intended to be used by 
the testator. In that case, the will bequeathed "personal 
effects" to testator's grandniece and the residue to char-
ity. The grandniece contended that "personal effects" 
included a deposit in the sum of $5,5G9.08 in tlw 
patient's fund account in the \"'" eterans Hospital. Th<' 
trial court held that "personal f•ffects" vrns free from 
ambiguity and rejectt•d an off er to prove by Pxtrinsic 
(•vidence that the decedent intendL•d personal effects to 
inrlude the cash deposit. On appeal the court held tlw 
words "personal effocts," in and of tlwmselves W<'re not 
ambiguous, hut that in thP contPxt and in the circum-
stances surrounding the testator, if estahlisl1e<l lJy 
extrinsic evidence, it could have lwen held that tlw 
testator in this instancP intendPd personal dfrcts to 
include the cash deposit and held that the ruling exclud-
ing the off PrPd extrinsir Pvidenr<' ~was <>nor. H <'ld: 
"\Ve agree tlwn, with the trial court; tlwrP ~was 
no ambiguity in the words rnwd tliat jnstifi(1d 
the receipt of f•xtrinsie evidence. Tlwn' are, how-
ever, other situations than the uncertainty of 
ambiguity that call for a sPcond look at the rPal 
meaning of 'personal effects' or similar ten11s .... 
The function of words is to ronvey thonght. 
vv"lly, then, if our oh.ieetive is to ase<'rtain tlll' 
testatrix' intention, should WP not lParn what slw 
meant by what she said~ It may he that shP us<><l 
words in a sense that they do not ordinarily 
convey. 
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"We have concluded that in order to give the 
will a construction according to the intent of the 
testatrix, the trial court should have admitted 
the profrered evidence in order that he might 
know if, as claimed, she had come to use the 
words 'personal effects' as embracing the sum 
she had on deposit in the hospital where she had 
thP othPr personal effects." 
The logic of Estate of Randall compels tlw conclu-
sion that the Trial Court erred in excluding the evidence 
contained in the Offer of Proof submitted on behalf of 
the appellant, for such could have explained the real 
iHtention of the decedent in using the word "Trust" 
in the 'Nill. 
The mere use of the word ''trust" or "trustee" is 
not conclusive that the testato.r intended a trust as a 
mattt>r of la\\'. Indeed, tlw rnen• use of the word may, 
of its('lf', create the ambiguity. In the follffwing cases, 
among others, the ·will said "Trust" or "Trustee," but 
tl1P courts held no trust ·was intended: Collins v. Mosher, 
·''IJJrn; A.rtell L Coons, supra; Pom:elino v. Pmzzelino, 
"'il]!m': Norman v. Pri11ce, s11pra. 
l f tlw Trial Court in the ease at bar had considNed 
t 111• Pxtrinsie <•videnee off Pred and l'('jected, and tlw 
~-;tipulation for distribution which contains no provision 
!'or a trnst (R -J.9), and the D('eree of Final Distribution 
<lat Pd J\1 ay 10, 19()(), (R. ~17) ·whieh omit to makP any 
provision for a irn:~t or nny rrf'Pr<'lW<' to paragraph ~ 
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of the Will, the Court might \Yell have concludede that 
in the Order of Partial Distribution of February 2.+, 
1959, the Court by its reference to paragraph 8 of the 
Will, did not intend to create a trust because the testator 
did not intend to create a trust and the reference in the 
Order of Partial Distribution to paragraph R of the \\Till 
should be treated as descriptive only. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO RE-
QUIRE APPELLANT TO ACCOUNT. 
In the absence of fraud or dishonesty, the prnvisions 
of the Order of Partial Distribution dated February 2.+, 
1959, waiving an accounting by the trustee hy incor-
porating the provisions of paragraph S of the \Vill are 
valid and enforceable. 
The provision of said vVill incorporated m said 
Dcirrep of Distribution rPads as follm,·s: 
" ... Without the nece:ssity of making any ac-
counting of any nature whatsoever to any p<'rson 
or party concerning- the administration of thi:s 
trust." 
lt is clear that in the absence of provrn10ns in the 
trust indenture waiving an accounting, a trustee is re-
quired to acrount. ThiR rult> is rodifo 1d in 7fi-1'.2-1~l" 
l".1C.A. 1~!1~. 
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However, there is nothing in the .Code section which 
provides that the creator of the trust may not include 
in the trust provisions waiving the~ requirement of an 
aecounting hy the trusteP. 
The rule stated in the first paragraph is supported 
liy Rl:'str:tement of Trusts, 8rtond, ~ 172: 
"Even though a trust is created, the neces-
sity of formal accounting by the trustee may be 
dispensed with, unless this is prohibited by 
statute. Thus, it may be provided that the trustee 
shall not be under any duty to account to the 
court. Such a provision is effective, unless, as in 
the case of testamentary trusts in some states, 
there is a statutory requirement for accounting 
·which cannot be dispensed with. 
* * * * * 
"If a trust is created, it is required by public 
policy that the trustee be answerable to the courts, 
so far at least as tlw honest;.c of his conduct is 
C'OTIC('rned." 
\VhPther or not it could have been argued that the 
inclusion in the OrdPr of Partial Distribution of tlH' 
]>rnvision for waivPr of an aerounting by the trush•e 
wm; enom'ous, it is establislie>d by the authorities, some 
of ·w!ti(·lt an• di:-scus:-wd in Point 1 of this brief, that tlw 
<nil:\" n•111ed:I' \\ cl.:S hy appeal from the Order of Partial 
Distrilrri.tion and in tlH' absence of appeal, tlw Deen-'(' 
l1n;' 1wemlH' final <~11d conC'lm:ivP evPn to the extent that 
i I is i•r;·on<•:n:s <1.nd it is n·~: <Hl_i"lc(1ienta arnl hirnling l1pon 
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all persons. Indeed, tlw Executor ha:-; even lwen finalh 
discharged. (R. 222). 
In their Answer and Cross Petition, respondPnts 
do not allege fraud or dishmwsty on the part of th1· 
trustee, nor did respondents offor any evidence ~wJii<'li 
might tend to sho\\- any sn<>h fraud or dishonPst)-. 
Therefore, whether the provision in paragraph ~ 
of the Will incorporated into the D<>cn·e of Distrilmtion 
waiving accounting by the hustl'e is valid or inva1id, 
there is no basis in the }H"l'S<'nt }H'O('e<'<lings affrr tlH· 
Decree o.f Distribution has became fina1, for th<' Conrt 
to make its Order requiring appellant n<w: to U<'('OLlll l 
as a condition to di: .. whar~:<'. 
As Sf't forth s117Jrn, it is tlw primary funetion ot 
thP ProbatP Court to dden11i1w and Pnfo1·e<' tlw t nH' 
intPntions of tl10 t<'stator. 
From a reading of paragraph S of th<' ~Will, it 
lwcomes apparent that tlw testator ma(l<~ Jffff\-ision for 
the distribution of the trust fund to his rPlative::, n•,'.!;md-
lPss of degree of kindrPd to llll'et ''eme1 g<·rn<<·s" a1 1d 
"for the use and henefit of thP \Yallich fnmil)'.'' Sinc-1• 
it might prove embarrassing to the n·ci1Ji<·nts of t!w 
funds to l 1avP tlwi r e1nergPnei<·s diselos<·<l in tlH' public 
r<'eord, the testator also insPrtPd the prnvisions w<1iv;w; 
an accounting. This d<·li<'at<· nrnl thong·hf'nl nd d t'.H 
ti•stator sl10nld not lightly lH' di:-:r1·c.?;nnl1·1~. 
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It is, therefore, submitted upon all of the grounds 
herein set forth that the Order and Decree appealed from 
must be reversed. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO ASSERT 
HE IS NOT A TRUSTEE. 
Neither of the receipts signed by appellant (R. 199-
201) are relevant because they were executed after the 
entry of the Order of Partial Distribution and they can-
not jmpeach or modify that final judgment. 
There is no evidence that respondents even knew of 
the receipts, or that they changed their position or relied 
thereon to their detriment. 
In Niccolls v. Niccolls, Cal. 143 P.712, an intervivos 
conveyance in trust to be effective on death of the 
grantor, was not executed with the formality of a will; 
hPld, the trustee was not estopped to assert the trust 
was void. 
vVhether or not a trust exists depends upon the 
intent of the testatm. The subsequent acts of appellant 
cannot supply the requisite intent of the testator. 
Estoppel precludes one from denying or asserting 
a material fact which bv his words or conduct he inten-' . 
tionallv or through rulpahle negligence induces another, 
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who was exciisably ignorant of the true facts to l;Plicrc 
and act upon them, thereby, as a reasonably anticipated 
consequence, changing 711°.<> position in such a ,,-a~1 that hP 
suffers injury if such contrary assertion or denial w<:>1·r· 
allowed. Migliaccio v. Davis, (1951) l 20 Vt. 1, 232 P.2d 
195. Here, there is no showing of inducement, no relianru 
hy cross-petitioners, no change of position and no injni·~-. 
CON CL UST ON 
The Order of Partial Distribution of February 21-, 
1959, herein is not ambiguous, does not incorporate thr 
will by reference and on its face distributed the l'PSi(hH' 
of the testator's estat(~ to appellant outright. The Dis-
trict Court erred in holding to the contrary by its Ord('l° 
of .January 28, 19GG, and tlu~ OrdN should 1le n-'Y('I'S<'rl 
and the case remanded to the District Court with instnir-
In the alternativP, if the Order of Partial Distrilrn-
tion did incorporate the 'Yill into its frrrns, then orn' 01· 
the terms so ineorporatPd is the provision ·waiving an ae-
<'Ounting hy appellant. Therl'fme the Disfr:d Court 
t>ITed in its Order of .January 2S, 19()() r<'qniring app<'l-
lant to account and such should be reversed and tlw 
('.ase remanded to the District Court with instruction:; 
without an aceonnting. 
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In the alternative, if the Order of Partial Distribu-
tion did incorporate the will into its terms, then the 
Will l<~ft the residue of decedent's estate to appellant 
<·itht>r outright, or for five years with povvPr to invade 
]Jrincipal. If the latter, since principal and income has 
been disposed of during the five-year period, there is no 
n<'ed for an accounting. In either event, the District 
Court':-; Order of .January 28, 196G, requiring appellant 
to account is in error and tht> case should be reversed 
and the case remanded with instructions to the District 
Court to discharge appellant as a tnrntee without an 
a<·counting. 
In the alternative, the will of the decedent is am-
higuous and the District Court erred in sustaining 
objections to offered extrinsic evidence to aid in resolv-
ing the ambiguity. Therefore, the District Court's Order 
of ,January 28, 19G6 should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the District Court with instructions to 
receive extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity in the 
-Will as to whether an outright gift, an estate for five 
yt>ars or a gift in trust of the residue of the estate was 
intPnded hy the decedent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNO'Y & 
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